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Abstract: One of the greatest challenges that confront the International 
Community today is terrorism. In recent times, through the Boko Haram 
insecurity challenge, Africa seems to have entered the mainstream of global 
terrorism. From the activities of the Al Qaeda in the Levant and the Islamic 
Maghreb, to the clearly desperate drive to acquire territory by the ISIS, in the 
Levant and in diverse parts of Africa as far south as Mali, terrorism seems to 
have arrived in black Africa. In recent times, terrorism has taken a new and 
indeed frightening dimension, particularly through the Boko Haram insurgency 
in Nigeria. The deadly terrorist activities in the North-East region of Nigeria 
which range from kidnapping and bombing, through various forms of mindless 
violence and killings, to outright military confrontation with security agencies in 
a desperate bid to acquire territory in northern Nigeria, have caused the Nigerian 
armed forces great losses in human and material resources. This is a study of the 
international dimensions of the Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The paper 
highlighted the immediate and the remote causes of the conflagration that 
attended the bourgeoning politico-religious conflict which now threatens the 
stability of the entire West African Sub-region. It is a descriptive analytical 
survey that utilizes archival materials, library research, extant literature, internet 
sources and particularly content analysis. The paper recommended a 
convergence of both domestic and international collaboration to tackle and 
defeat terrorism in Africa, and concluded that within Nigeria itself, the need for 
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accountability and good governance as a lasting panacea for national security is 
sine qua non. 
Key Words: National Security, Insurgency, Terrorism, Domestic Environment,                    
International Dimensions, Conflict 
 
Introduction 
The Nigerian State is a kaleidoscope of 
rainbow-coloured ethnic nationalities, 
juxtaposed upon a motley crowd of 
naturally diverse peoples. It is not only 
diffracted along its socio-political and 
ideological cleavages, but also 
balkanized along lines of hardly-
reconcilable religious, linguistic, 
cultural and ethnic differences. This is 
clearly a situation that is potentially 
conflict-generating, and a recipe for 
domestic insurgency and international 
terrorism. When to this potpourri of 
political and cultural diversity is added a 
deeply ingrained corruption-ridden 
public space and primordial loyalties, 
together with poverty and environmental 
degradation in the perspective of an 
almost failed state, then the recipe for 
international terrorism seems complete. 
It was only a matter of time before the 
yawning socio-political vacuum was 
filled by opportunistic power seekers, 
using pseudo-religious clichés, to 
mobilize the ignorant, the gullible and 
the vulnerable and arm them for a 
violent overthrow of the political status 
quo in the perspective of power politics. 
This paper delves into the origins, 
causes and direction of terrorism in 
North-East Nigeria, chronicles the 
structure of destruction and pillage, and 
highlights the near helplessness of the 
Nigerian Government to single-
handedly deal with the resultant 
carnage. Given the constituents of the 
Nigerian State and the inherent 
contradictions within the socio-political 
under belly of this African giant, the 
internationalization of what began as a 





The concept of security is a multi-
dimensional one, encompassing diverse 
issues. Although diverse literature on 
this topical issue do not arrive 
(contextually) at a universally agreeable 
definition of the concept, National 
Security is generally understood to be 
that indispensable ingredient necessary 
for the preservation of a state through 
effective economic, political and 
strategic means.  
According to the 1996 definition 
propagated by the National Defence 
College of India; 
National security is an appropriate 
and aggressive blend of political 
resilience and maturity, human 
resources, economic structure and 
capacity, technological competence, 
industrial base and availability of 
natural resources, and finally 
military might (National Defence 
College, 1996 cited in Ayodele, 
2004; 3).  
The above definition conceives of 
national security first from the political 
angle, which is described as “political 
resilience and maturity”, second is the 
economic dimension to national security 
which it defines as the “availability of 
natural resources and technological 
competence, industrial base and 
economic structure”; and lastly from the 
strategic angle which it described as 
“military might”. 
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Political resilience and maturity is an 
expression of the willingness and ability 
of differing elements within a political 
system to play out the game of interest 
actualization without necessarily 
disturbing the working of the system 
through unhealthy rivalry and a hostile 
struggle for power. This is thus indeed 
the expression of harmony within the 
political system. 
 
The economic dimension to National 
Security includes the availability of a 
conducive economic environment 
within which every individual can 
pursue and access his daily means for 
survival without hindrance. It therefore 
encapsulates the efficient and effective 
functioning of those structures that are 
sin-qua-non for the attainment of 
economic prosperity and preservation, 
already conceived by the Indian 
National Defence College as 
“technological competence” and a 
“strong industrial base”. 
 
The strategic angle which is described 
as “military might” is about the most 
fundamental aspect of National 
Security. In fact, it is that indispensable 
element without which harmony and 
discipline would be but a façade. It 
encapsulates the level of effectiveness 
of the security forces such as the Police, 
Civil Defence, the State Secret Service 
(SSS), the Army, the Navy, the Air 
force, inter-alia, and their level of 
sophistication in safeguarding human 
lives and property from external and 
internal seizure. This, being the most 
fundamental aspect of National 
Security, is the salient embodiment of 
security. 
 
Hence, for the purpose of this paper, 
National Security would be 
conceptualized as the existence of 
functional, efficient and effective human 
and non-human structures that are 
necessary for ensuring, protecting and 
preserving the order, harmonious 
working and peaceful co-existence of all 
elements in the state. 
 
Insurgency 
With the increasing interest shown by 
scholars on the subject of insurgency, 
several issues have been ascribed to the 
concept. It has thus been impregnated 
with several definitions which often 
tend to confuse rather than clarify. This 
is because varieties of terms (not 
precisely defined) often fall under the 
descriptions ascribed to insurgency, 
such as terrorism, rebellion, uprisings, 
inter-alia. 
According to the British Ministry of 
Defence,  
Insurgency could be defined as the 
actions of a minority group within a 
state with the intent to forcing 
political change by means of a 
mixture of subversion, propaganda 
and military pressure, aiming to 
persuade or intimidate the broad 
mass of people to accept such a 
change. (BMOD cited in Morris, 
2001). 
The United States Department of 
Defence doctrinally defined Insurgency 
as; 
An organized resistance movement 
that uses subversion, sabotage and 
armed conflict to achieve its aims. 
They may also seek to: (1) 
Overthrow an established 
government without a follow on 
social revolution. (2) Establish an 
autonomous national territory 
within the borders of a state. (3) 
Cause the withdrawal of an 
occupying power. (4) Extract 
political concessions that are 
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unattainable through less violent 
means (USDOD, 2007). 
The above definitions invariably deliver 
a broad description of the antics of, as 
well as the salient objectives that drive 
insurgencies. As an organized resistance 
movement against constituted authority, 
insurgencies are fueled and driven by 
ideologies (usually radical) that seek the 
enforcement of such intended changes. 
It is however important to note that the 
causes of insurgency lie in unfulfilled 
aspirations and what are perceived as 
legitimate grievances which may justify 
armed rebellion. Hence, the British 
Ministry of Defence (2001) further 
observed that an Insurgency may be 
caused by the following: 
i. Economic failure with its attendant 
dialectical conditions of extreme 
wealth and extreme poverty 
ii. Unfulfilled expectations especially 
amongst the middle-class and 
intelligentsia of the population. It is 
here that expectations of an 
improved way of life are usually 
greatest. 
Though, such a tactic as terror may be 
used by insurgents to attain their goal, 
the movement is usually induced by 
oppression, injustice, discrimination and 
subjugation. In other words, 
insurgencies are usually violent 
expressions of frustration with a system 
that is perceived to be antagonistic and 
hostile to the survival of a group. 
 
One major distinguishing feature of 
insurgency is that typical insurgents 
organize their forces in military fashion 
as squads, platoons, and companies… 
and are often overt in nature, especially 
in zones which they dominate (Morris, 
2005). 
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, 
Insurgency would be conceptualized as 
an overt, radical organized resistance 
against constituted government by a 
group or movement within a state that 
seeks the collapse of an „oppressive‟ 




If there is any concept that can be 
described as totally defiant of universal 
conceptualization, it is terrorism. As a 
phenomenon, terrorism poses quite 
serious problems at definition and 
conceptualization (Afinotan, 2010). It is 
generally agreed that terrorism involves 
the calculated use of violence or threat 
of unlawful violence to inculcate or 
create an atmosphere of fear in a given 
population in pursuit of political, 
religious or ideological goals 
(Coloumbis and Wolfe, 1986). 
However, this description ascribed to 
Terrorism also holds true of such 
concepts as “insurgency”, “guerrilla 
warfare” or other forms of war. The 
question hence is; what distinguishes 
terrorism these? 
As it is generally agreed from empirical 
evidence that terrorism is the systematic 
use of terror, especially as a means of 
coercion intended to create fear and 
cause injuries in pursuit of a definite 
aim, it has become a widely accepted 
caption that “one man‟s terrorist is 
another man‟s freedom fighter.” This 
has thrown all attempts as designing a 
workable definition of Terrorism off 
balance. In fact, from a purely Marxist 
perspective, such a radical or 
revolutionary group would be described 
as a liberation movement and their 
struggle would be perceived as patriotic 
and nationalistic.  
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However, in September 2006, Mahinda 
Rajapakse (who was at pains to 
emphatically draw a distinction between 
Terrorism and Liberation) at the 
conference of the Non-Alignment 
Movement in Havana, declared that: 
Terrorism and Liberation differ 
from each other as much as the sky 
differs from the earth. Liberation 
unlike Terrorism is a creative and 
humane force. It is a humane vehicle 
of new visions for the progressive 
(sic) of power structures on the one 
side, and socio-economic structures 
on the other. Terrorism, by contrast 
is a destructive force, a 
dehumanizing force that cannot be 
in anyway justified. Terrorism poses 
a grave threat to the political and 
economic being, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of nation-states 
(Rajapaksa 2006 cited in Afinotan, 
2010; 5). 
Hence, it is germane that for a clarified 
conceptualization, Terrorism be viewed 
from two inseparably linked angles: 
i. Terrorism as a methodology of 
action. 
ii. Terrorism as a social fact. 
Terrorism as a methodology simply 
encapsulates the methods used by 
terrorist groups, insurgent groups, 
belligerents, freedom fighters, inter-alia, 
to achieve their goals. Thus, as a method 
of actualizing defined aims, terrorism 
encompasses acts of terror, suicide 
bombings, and other forms of unlawful 
violence, whether by individuals, 
groups, governments or transnational 
and international organizations, which 
invariably cause fear, panic, 
consternation, disenchantment and 
psychological depression among human 
collectivities. By implication, terrorism, 
as a methodology is merely a means to 
an end, which may be wielded as 
unavoidable course of action by 
liberation movements or insurgents, 
and/or terrorists, alike.  
 
On the other hand, terrorism as a social 
fact focuses on the main intent, goal and 
objective that drive the actions of 
terrorist movements. It distinguishes 
terrorists from insurgents or liberation 
movements. As a social fact, Terrorism 
is a political phenomenon. In other 
words, Terrorism as a phenomenon is 
directed towards the attainment of a 
(solely) political objective (Afinotan, 
2007). The implication of this is that the 
fundamental political motive may be 
hidden behind the mask of religion or 
ideology. According to Morgenthau 
(1948) however, the political objective 
is woven around the attainment of 
power either by an individual, by states, 
groups, or movements. The above 
argument thus suggests that the singular 
goal of terrorism lies in the pursuit of 
power. 
 
Consequently, for the purpose of this 
paper, Terrorism may be described as 
the systematic and patterned use of 
terror by movements, groups, 
organizations or governments, aimed at 
causing fear, panic, consternation, 
confusion and disenchantments, and 
directed towards the attainment of a 
political objective that is defined by 
power.  
 
Although this definition may not 
provide a perfect conception of 
Terrorism, it serves as an analytical tool 
for conceptualizing this pressing 
problematique- National Security, Boko 
Haram Insurgency and the International 
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In the course of seeking to devise a 
workable framework for analysis of 
National Security, Boko Haram and the 
International Dimensions of Terrorism, 
several theories and models were 
considered. Among those considered 
were; the Political Economy Approach, 
Frustration-Aggression Theory by John 
Dollard, and Tedd Gurr‟s Theory of 
Relative Deprivation.  
However, the variegated manifestations 
of National insecurity in Nigeria at 
different points in its history have all 
seemed to have their primordial roots in 
its internal social, political, economic 
and ethno-religious contradictions. 
Thus, if the Boko Haram threat to 
National security in Nigeria is viewed in 
a single wave of thought largely as just 
another erupted bubble in the murky 
waters of National Insecurity in the state 
(heated up by the consuming fires of 
political, social, economic and ethno-
religious imbroglios), then Political 
Economy may have been the most 
suitable framework for analysis. At 
least, the concept (which today has 
assumed the Marxian persuasion) 
embraces (in the general sense) the 
social, political, economic, religious 
forces that may account for certain 
political phenomena or upheavals, 
where economic contradictions are 
taken as the sole foundation (sub-
structure) upon which political, social 
and ethno-religious upheavals and 
revolutions are built. It would thus 
indicate that, what may have accounted 
for past insurgencies in the country also 
accounts for the Boko Haram security 
challenge. And this may be misleading.  
 
At least, if the thought that the Boko 
Haram security challenge has deep roots 
in the social and economic 
marginalization of a large section of the 
northern states is anything to go by, then 
John Dollard‟s Frustration-Aggression 
Theory, and Tedd Gurr‟s Theory of 
Relative Deprivation may have been 
suitable frameworks for analysis of the 
Boko Haram security menace. It would 
then place such occurrences as the rise 
of Niger-Delta militias, and the 
consequent eruption of the Niger-Delta 
crisis at the same level, rank and profile 
as Boko Haram security challenge. 
 
However, the plot to force the Nigerian 
government and the State at large to 
unconditional accept the “supremacy” of 
Sharia Law (a condition that has hitherto 
never reared its head in Nigerian 
history), reveals some element of 
relentless and audacious hunger and 
struggle for power with the Nigerian 
State. This has been absent, or more 
liberally expressed, less pronounced in 
other security challenges experienced in 
Nigeria‟s history. Perhaps, a theoretical 
focus on this germane but quite silent 
aspect of the Boko Haram security 
challenge could unravel the actual 
problem, and aid the study in the correct 
assessment of the peculiarity of the 
nature and character of the National 
Security question posed by the Boko 
Haram sect in Nigeria and its wider 
dimensions and implications. Hence, the 
choice of the Power-Politics framework, 
otherwise known as the Realist 
perspective of Hans Morgenthau as the 
preferred framework for analysis of this 
problematique. 
 
The Power Politics Model 
This approach, also known as Political 
Realism, is credited to Hans 
Morgenthau, in his famous work titled 
Politics Among Nations (1948), where 
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he sought to develop a comprehensive 
theory of international politics. In spite 
of the fact that political realism(the 
Realist Approach) is largely claimed to 
be a theory of International Relations, 
Keaney, a graduate of the University of 
South Florida observed that as 
significant as the theory of Realism has 
proved to be in the practice of 
(domestic) politics, its importance 
within International Relations has 
consistently declined (Keaney, 2006; 1). 
The basic foundation upon which 
Morgenthau built his power paradigm 
was his submission that International 
Politics, like all politics, is the struggle 
for power. Accordingly, politics, like 
society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature, which is unchanging 
(Morgenthau 1948 cited in Keaney, 
2006). Human nature however, as 
described by Hobbes in his Leviathan 
revolves around the perpetual and 
relentless struggle for power after power 
(at any cost and by any means) that 
ceases only in physical death. Hence 
one can develop a rational and 
consistent measurement of human 
political actions, and offer an over-
arching analysis of the character of 
human social interrelationships (in 
whatever form it may manifest), that 
reflects these objective laws. 
 
These objective laws that bear and 
reflect the human nature first indicate 
that, interest, which is the singular 
driving force behind all human actions 
and inactions, is defined in terms of 
power (Morgenthau, 1948; cited in 
Keaney; 2006). In consonance with this 
fact, Gorge Washington, former 
president of the United States of 
America, once emphasized that: 
A small knowledge of human nature 
would convince us that with far the 
greatest part of mankind, interest is 
the governing principle, and that 
almost every man is more or less 
under its influence… it is vain to 
exclaim against the depravity of 
human nature on this account, the 
fact is so, the experience of every age 
and nation has proved it, and we must 
in a great measure change the 
constitution of man, before we can 
make it otherwise. No institution, not 
built on the presumptive truths of 
these maxims can succeed 
(Washington cited in Knopf, 1978). 
And power (as the sole definition of 
political interest) covers the domination 
of man by man and comprises anything 
that ensures and establishes control of 
man over man. Thus power covers all 
social relationships, which serve that 
end, from physical violence to the most 
subtle psychological ties by which one 
mind controls another (Morgenthau; 
revised 1978). This sets the political 
sphere apart from other spheres of 
action such as economics (which defines 
interest in terms of wealth and its 
accumulation), and religion (which 
defines interest in terms of morality and 
righteousness). Morgenthau further 
posited that power covers the 
domination of man by moral ends (too), 
and controlled by constitutional 
safeguards as in Western Democracies, 
and when it is that untamed force finds 
its laws in nothing but its own strength, 
and its sole justification in its 
aggrandizement.  
 
Hence, political realists believe that the 
sole underlying motive behind any 
political action, by either individuals, 
movements, sects, states, or 
international organizations, is woven 
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around the attainment and preservation 
of power where any means defined as 
rational and justified within the 
boundaries of time and space are 
devised. Power becomes not only a 
means to an end, but also an end in 
itself.  
 
Although Political Realism is aware of 
the moral significance of political 
action, it is also aware of the ineluctable 
tension between the moral command 
and the requirement of successful 
political action. And it is willing to gloss 
over and obliterate that tension and thus 
to obfuscate both moral and political 
issues, by making it as though the stark 
facts of politics were morally more 
satisfying than they actually are, and the 
moral law more exacting than it actually 
is (Morgenthau; revised, 1978). By 
implication, where conscience or moral 
dictates clash with the political goal 
(power), the political (always) 
supersedes the moral. As such, Political 
Realism portrays man as the “political 
man”. 
 
Power Politics (Political Realism) has 
been criticized for defining the interest 
of man solely along selfish lines. For 
instance, Tickner Ann (2012) observed 
that Morgenthau‟s abstract “political 
man” lacks moral constraints and lives 
in a Hobbesian state of war and thus 
Morgenthau principles as well as his 
language and delivery in general 
provide only a partial and one-sided 
view description of local and 
international politics. By narrowing 
down the interest of man solely in the 
political (defined as power), 
Morgenthau‟s thesis ignores the 
economic, moral, and religious man, 
whose interests may be completely at 
opposite parallels to the accumulation 
and preservation of power. 
 
In spite of these criticisms, however, 
Power Politics has served as a useful 
framework for analysis of diversified, 
intricate and multi-faceted political 
phenomena. For example, Parastar Uptal 
(2012) of Hindustan Times used the 
framework for analyzing the fierce 
rivalry among political elites and 
political parties in the Republic of 
Nepal. Since indicators point to the 
struggle for power among Nigerian 
elites as the core of the Boko Haram 
menace and the question of National 
security in Nigeria, Power Politics thus 
serves as the most suitable framework 
for analysis of National Security, Boko 
Haram Insurgency and the International 
Dimensions of Terrorism. 
 
The Ecology of Terrorism in 
Northeast Nigeria 
According to Roland (2012), the social 
ecology of recruitment, from what can 
be observed explains Boko Haram‟s 
relative success. One thing which can be 
observed is the existence of very porous 
international borders in the Northern 
region of the State. These porous, 
literally non-existent borders facilitate 
the movement of arms and mercenaries 
from neighbouring countries and from 
the Islamic Maghreb. The conflict in 
Mali where Islamists fleeing the assaults 
of French troops found safe havens in 
Northern Nigeria and neighbouring 
states of Niger and Chad is an instance 
worthy of note. Boko Haram recruits are 
drawn from among migrants from Chad, 
Niger, and other neighbouring countries 
who are in precarious economic 
situations, because of the collapse of the 
industrial sector and commercial 
farming (Roland, 2012; 4). This they 
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believed, of course, to be an unfortunate 
outcome of the liberalization 
programmes enforced under the advice 
of Bretton Woods institutions from the 
1980s. At least, these homeless migrants 
could easily serve as loyal and potent 
disciples of the teachings of Yusuf 
against western education and its 
accompanying “economic injustices”. 
 
Also worthy of note, is the fact as stated 
by Allison (2011) that Boko Haram 
typically uses Ak-47 rifles in its attacks, 
but the exact number and types of 
weapons utilized in their arsenals are 
unknown. However, Boko Haram is 
thought to have several weapon caches 
that were brought into Africa‟s Sahel 
region by weapons-smugglers after the 
fall of Libya‟s leader, Muammar 
Gaddaffi. He further reported that these 
weapons include: surface-to-air missiles, 
rocket-propelled grenades, vehicle 
mounted anti-aircraft machine guns, 
automatic rifles, grenades and 
explosives. 
 
A significant proportion of the Boko 
Haram sect is drawn from the 
“Almejiri” (pupils and students learning 
Qur‟an (Roland, 2012). Forest (2012; 
61) further described the Almejiri as the 
“ragged boys” sent by their parents to 
Islamic boarding schools in Northern 
Nigeria, where they receive little 
education beyond note memorization of 
the Qur‟an. They receive money and are 
forced to beg in the streets in order to 
survive. Some teachers at these schools 
have been known to abuse these 
children, in some cases, taking a portion 
of whatever people give them, and in 
some other cases, using them as foot 
soldiers in religious clashes (Forest, 
2012; 62). Little wonder that these could 
easily be used as effective tools for the 
actualization of radical Islamic 
ideologies. This was the kind of school 
that was established by Mohammed 
Yusuf (Forest, 2012; 62).  
 
The North-Eastern region of Nigeria is 
also populated by school leavers and 
graduates who have been unable to find 
employment, and are attracted by the 
messages of the charismatic “Yusufist” 
ideology.  
 
According to the Vanguard Newspaper 
of 21st April, 2016: 
It has come to the knowledge of the 
Defence Headquarters that Boko 
Haram terrorists have now devised 
another means of recruiting 
unsuspecting youths into their fold. 
In this clandestine dispensation, 
Boko Haram terrorists have 
resorted to providing loans to 
young entrepreneurs and artisans 
in the North East as a way of 
inducing them for recruitment. The 
major targets of the unholy 
engagements are youths in the 
North East, especially butchers, 
traders, tailors, beauticians and 
other vocational entrepreneurs who 
could be easily enticed with such 
loan without paying attention to 
sundry inherent dangers associated 
with the acceptance of such 
goodies from the satanic group or 
unfamiliar source (Vanguard, April 
21, 2016). 
Boko Haram has also appealed to people 
like university lecturers who come from 
middle-class homes, and who reject all 
Western and Christian influences 
(Forest, 2012; 62). Consequently, due to 
the peculiar character and pattern of the 
social ecology of the North-East, the 
Boko Haram is made up of a 
combination of aggrieved citizens who 
have become psychological victims of 
the poor socio-economic state of the 
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country, and of individuals who through 
extreme Islamic education and socio-
economic conditions in the region, have 
seen themselves as having no stake in 
life, and as a result, lack the desire to 
develop themselves and become 
productive members of the wider 
community and the Nigerian state at 
large. They can thus be easily used as 
potent instruments for the actualization 
of anti-western ideology, which the 
“Yusufist” teachings advocate. 
 
The Structure of Terrorist Violence in 
Northeast Nigeria 
Boko Haram‟s pattern of violence 
appears to be highly stratified and 
ramified. It began with the killing of 
civil populations in Maiduguri and 
environs, especially occasional and 
well-coordinated attacks on Christian 
worshippers in churches and prayer 
houses. With the intervention of the 
police however, the violence began to 
escalate, resulting in the arrest and 
eventual extra-judicial killing of Yusuf, 
the founder and leader of the Boko 
Haram sect by the police. The group 
began to attack police stations, 
government offices and prominent 
politicians as well as natural rulers. This 
later snow-balled into blood cuddling 
assaults on schools, media and mosques, 
using all manner of lethal weapons and 
home-made bombs, described as IEDS. 
Hundreds of innocent citizens were 
murdered in their homes and work 
places as well as in the streets of major 
cities, bus stops and motor-parks across 
the northern half of Nigeria. 
 
The year 2012 saw a radical escalation 
of violence with the bombing of the 
Yanya motor-park and the United 
Nations Building in Abuja. This was 
then followed by the introduction of 
suicide bombing on a larger scale, 
deploying men, women and children to 
wreak havoc on civil populations across 
the land. On the heels of this happening 
was the plan and eventual decision to 
establish a Caliphate on Nigerian soil, 
taking and keeping territory, and 
hoisting their banner in a clear and 
unmistakable push to wrest power from 
the legitimate government of the 
Nigerian Federation. Announcing 
formally their alliance with, and 
allegiance to the Al Qaeda network and 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), they expressed their objective of 
ruling Nigeria as an Islamic State 
governed by Sharia Law. This therefore 
became clearly recognizable as no 
genuine Islamic Jihad, but a struggle for 
control of the Nigerian State in an all-
out war in the perspective of Power-
Politics. The linkage with ISIL, Al 
Qaeda and the Hezbolla amounted to the 
internationalization of what began as a 
domestic conflict. 
 
On April 14th, 2014, the group attacked 
a female school in Chibok and abducted 
219 secondary school girls, an action 
which attracted international outreach 
and world-wide condemnation. The 
Federal Government consented to a 
cease-fire proposal to allow for 
conditional release of the Chibok girls 
due mainly to pressure from foreign 
governments and domestic civil society. 
On Friday, 17th October, 2014, 
government negotiators met with their 
counterparts, negotiating on behalf of 
Boko-Haram in the Chadian capital of 
N‟Djamena (Sunday Punch, 19th 
October, 2014). Following the 
negotiations which allegedly took place 
in Saudi Arabia, Nigeria‟s Chief of 
Defense Staff, acting on the 
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understanding that the sect had agreed to 
a cease-fire, ordered the Nigerian troops 
to respect the agreement and not fire at 
the sect‟s fighters, especially as the 
release of the Chibok girls was on the 
cards. Everyone had expected that after 
the talks being mediated by Chadian 
President Idris Derby would have been 
fine-tuned in N‟Djamena, the girls 
would be released (The Nation, 13th 
October, 2014). This did not happen.  
By October 29th, 2014, the town of 
Mubi in Adamawa state was attacked 
and seized by Boko Haram. The 234 
Nigerian Army Battalion in the town 
was overrun, hundreds of residents were 
killed, and thousands displaced (The 
Nation, October 30th, 2014). The sect 
hoisted their flag at the palace of the 
Emir of Mubi and burned down the 
Mubi prison after releasing all prisoners 
therein, and the police station (The 
Nation, October 30, 2014). By this time, 
the sect had sacked the Nigerian 
Military from Michika, and overrun the 
entire territory from Madagali to Bazza. 
This structure of violence thereby 
revealed a character of the sect as well 
as the fundamental objectives for which 
they fought. They wanted territory and 
lebensraum in the perspective of ISIL in 
the Levant and the Hezbollah in the 
Islamic Maghreb, from where to 
consolidate and overrun the Nigerian 
state. They wanted power to prosecute 
on an international scale, a narrow and 
selfish agenda, probably for their oft-
stated purpose of establishing yet 
another fundamentalist Islamic state, 
this time in Black Africa. Below is a 
detail of some atrocities committed by 
the sect in Northern Nigeria and 
Cameroon between 2010 and 2016. 
_07 September 2010, the group 
attacked Bauchi prisons, killed five 
security guards and an estimated 
800 prisoners were released, 
including at least 120 terrorists or 
supporters who were awaiting trial. 
_ 31 December 2010, Mammy 
market explosion at Mogadishu 
Barracks in Abuja; an estimated 10 
lives were lost. 
_ 28 January 2011, killed six 
politicians and a gubernatorial 
aspirant of ANPP – Madu Fannami 
Gubio, Senator Modu Sheriff‟s 
Cousin. 
_April 8, 2011, Bomb explosion at 
Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) office in 
Suleja, Niger State. The lives of 8 
serving Youth Corps members, 
including the suicide bomber, were 
claimed. 
_ 12 May 2011, kidnapped two 
engineers Chris McManus from 
Northwest, England and Franco  
Lamolinara, an Italian from 
BirninKebbi. They were eventually 
murdered on 08 March, 2012. 
_ 16 June 2011,Four children were 
killed in a church playground 
during an explosion in the southern 
part of Maiduguri, Borno State. 
That same day, there was a bomb 
explosion of Nigeria Police 
headquarters (Louis Edet House in 
Abuja, killing eight people died, 
shattering the glass windows of the 
seven storey building and 
destroyed scores of vehicles in the 
parking lot. 
_ 26 August 2011, bombing of the 
UN building in Abuja by a suicide 
bomber. The suicide bomber drove 
into the compound by ramming a 
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gate, then maneuvered his vehicle 
into the parking garage before 
detonating the bomb. 50 persons 
died. 
_5 November, 2011, there was a 
series of patterned attacks in Borno 
and Yobe States, primarily around 
Damaturu, killing about 70 people 
and razing a new police 
headquarters and State 
Government burned. According to 
reports, a Boko Haram spokesman 
informed Daily Trust that his sect 
was responsible for the attacks, and 
promised more. 
_25 December 2011, bomb blast at 
St. Theresa Catholic Church at 
Madalla, Niger State on Christmas 
Day. 50 people died. 
_20 January 2012, Kano coordinated 
bomb attacks, 250 people were 
killed. 
_10 June 2012, in the central city of 
Jos, a suicide bomber blew himself 
up outside a church, wounding at 
least 50 people. 
_28 October 2012, at least seven 
people were killed and dozens 
injured in a suicide bombing 
during a Mass at a Catholic Church 
in Kaduna, Kaduna State. An 
explosive-laden vehicle drove in to 
the church and detonated its load, 
ripping a hole in the wall and roof. 
_ On 02 December 2013, about 200 
Boko Haram members dressed in 
military uniforms and armed with 
sophisticated weapons like rocket 
launchers attacked the air force 
base and military barracks in 
Maiduguri and destroyed property 
worth millions of naira 
_ 17 September 2013, Boko Haram 
insurgents burnt houses and killed 
142 people at Benisheikh in Borno 
state. 
_ 28 September 2014, Boko Haram 
terrorists invaded College of 
Agriculture at Gujba in Yobe state 
at night and killed at least 63 
students who were sleeping at their 
hostels. 
_ 02 December 2013, about 200 
Boko Haram insurgents deceitfully 
dressed in military uniforms and 
launched coordinated attacks on a 
military barracks and an airforce 
base in Maiduguri. About 7 aircraft 
and several other property were 
burnt and an unconfirmed number 
of civilians and soldiers were 
murdered. 
_ 20 December 2013, the military 
barracks at Bama in Bornu state 
was viciously and ruthlessly 
attacked. 
_ 27 January 2014, Kawuri village in 
Konduga local government area of 
Borno state was attacked by Boko 
Haram. Several houses were razed 
and 85 people killed. 
_ 11 February 2014, a group of Boko 
Haram insurgents invaded 
Konduga in Bornu state and burnt 
down about 2000 houses, killed 39 
people and wounded several 
others. 
_ 15 February 2014, Boko Haram 
gunmen killed 9 soldiers and 90 
civilians in a village at the Gwoza 
Local Government area of Borno 
state. That same day, Bama, the 
third largest town in Borno state 
was attacked. Boko Haram 
operated here unhindered between 
3.30am and 12noon. At the end of 
their operation, 98 persons were 
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killed, 400 vehicles were burnt and 
over 400 people were wounded. 
_ 14 April, 2014, there was a bomb 
explosion at the Nyanya motor 
park in Abuja leaving not less than 
75 people dead, 215 wounded and 
several vehicles burnt. 
_ April 14-15, 2014, Boko Haram 
insurgents invaded Government 
Girls Secondary School in Chibok, 
Borno state and kidnapped over 
200 girls writing their Senior 
School CertificateExamination 
(SSCE). 
_ On 05 May 2014, Boko Haram 
insurgents invaded Gamboru-Ngala 
Local Government Area in Borno 
state and killed 300 people 
(including 16 policemen). 
_ 22 May 2014, a twin bomb 
explosion at Jos Terminus market 
in Plateau state, leaving at least,  
122 people dead, several critically 
injured and property worth 
inestimable fortune brutally 
destroyed. 
_20 July 2015, suspected Boko 
Haram gunmen raided Buratai, the 
native village of the Chief of 
Defence Staff, Major General 
Tukur Yusuf Buratai. 
_21 July 2015, suspected Boko 
Haram attacks left more than 50 
people dead. There were also 
reported twin suicide attacks in 
Maroua, Northern Cameroon, 
killing at least 11. In addition to 
this, some 42 people lost their lives 
in a series of blasts at two bus 
stations in Gombe. 
_9 August 2015, Boko Haram shot 
dead four people and abducted five 
others during an ambush on a 
highway in Borno State. 
_10 December 2015, Boko Haram 
killed seven civilians in the 
Kamuya village, located along the 
border between Borno and Yobe 
States. The terrorist burned down 
the entire village.  
_19 April, 2016, the  Acting General 
Officer Commanding (GOC), 7 
Division Nigerian Army, Brigdier 
General Victor Ezugwu and his 
convoy were ambushed by 
suspected Boko Haram terrorists 
during the General‟s visit troops in 
Bama Local Government area of 
Borno State, leaving one soldier 
dead and two others injured during 
the ambush 
(Source: Researched and compiled by 
the authors from various Nigerian 
newspapers and television stations 
between 2010 and 2016). 
 
The International Dimensions of the 
Terrorist Activities  
The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria 
assumed international proportions 
within the first few months of its 
inception. This became easily 
discernible from the methodology of its 
operation which resembled very closely 
the manner of operation of exiting 
extremist Jihadist movements in other 
parts of the world such as the ISIL, Al 
Qaeda and the Hezbollah. Its later 
declaration of direct affiliation with, and 
loyalty to ISIL, was regarded by 
analysts as merely a painful elaboration 
of the obvious. But with his declaration 
and further evidence garnered by 
security agencies, Boko Haram signaled 
to the world its link with the world-wide 
network of terrorism. Evidence garnered 
by Nigeria‟s security agencies in 2013 
from arrested Boko Haram suspects 
indicated that Hezbollah, the Lebanese 
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militant group and other terrorist 
organizations may have chosen Nigeria 
as a base from which to launch terror 
attacks on their targets. (Tell Magazine, 
June 17, 2013). The situation which 
played itself out in the arrest and 
conviction Abagani and Jega in Kano in 
2013 showed very clearly that there 
were international connections in the 
Boko Haram scourge ab initio. Abagani 
and his Nigerian collaborator as well as 
Abdulaasad Tahini were found to be 
veterans of the Hezbollah organization 
sent out to carry out specialized tasks in 
target countries. 
 
In November 2013, the United States 
Department of State designated Boko 
Haram as a terrorist organization 
believed to have links with Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb. But, what really 
constitutes the international dimensions 
of terrorism in this context really 
concerns the transformation of the 
conflict from an internal affair into a 
regional crisis embracing Nigeria‟s 
immediate neighbours, Chad, Niger and 
Cameroon. This may really be 
considered natural as these countries all 
share borders with Nigeria. It probably 
is the most important impediment to 
complete military victory over the 
insurgents by the Nigerian state, as the 
foreign sources of financial logistics and 
military hardware which include 
sophisticated modern weapons of war, 
flow through these neighbouring 
territories. According to Gilbert (2014):  
Boko Haram insurgents 
collaboratively fought with AQIM 
and Movement for Unity and Jihad 
in West Africa in Northern Mali in 
2012. They thus have access to the 
psychological motivation, 
ideological inspiration, 
technological exposure, military 
training, logistic facilities, 
financial empowerment, and 
perhaps personnel of these 
fundamentalist Islamic groups. The 
porosity of Nigeria’s borders also 
facilitates the fluidity and 
movement of members of the group 
from one neighbouring country to 
another. Abubakar Shekau for 
example reportedly fled to Gao in 
Northern Mali with a thigh injury 
after he was almost caught by 
security forces on September 24, 
2012. 
On the side of the Nigerian 
Government, there has been foreign 
assistance by friendly states to help 
handle the Boko Haram threat. The 
United States of America for example, 
did deploy 80 military personnel with 
drone aircraft facilities to help in the 
search for the Chibok girls (Gilbert, 
2014). Besides, the French president 
Francois Hollande had hosted an 
unprecedented regional security summit 
in Paris for leaders of contiguous states 
around Nigeria to fashion out 
collaborative strategies to defeat the 
Boko Haram menace. Britain, the 
European Union and the United States 
were represented at the summit. Other 
nations like China and Isreal, among 
others, have indicated interests in 
supporting Nigeria, especially in the 
search for the Chibok girls. 
 
Besides, the conflict had since taken a 
regional dimension when Boko Haram 
launched coordinated attacks also at 
civil and military populations in Niger, 
Chad and Cameroon from their bases in 
Sambisa forest in Nigeria. Nigeria under 
President Mohammadu Buhari has also 
paid state visits to Chad, Cameroon, 
Niger and Benin Republic to canvass 
military and logistic support for the 
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battle against Boko Haram in Northern 
Nigeria. On this issue, there is a 
congruence of interest between all 
countries in the region, and in Black 
Africa at large. This is probably why the 
African Union (AU) waded into the 
conflict by putting together a 
multinational African force to be based 
in N‟Djamena to help combat and defeat 
the Boko Haram monstrosity. Perhaps it 
was this need to put together a coalition 
to defeat Boko Haram that informed 
President Buhari‟s decision to pull 
Nigeria into membership of the Islamic 
Coalition against terrorism during his 
state visit to Saudi Arabia in March, 
2016. 
 
The Way Forward 
Given our analysis so far of the realities 
of the Boko Haram security challenge in 
Nigeria and the entire sub-region, it is 
fairly obvious that the capacity to defeat 
Boko Haram conclusively, does not lie 
within the competence of any single 
state in the region, no matter how 
powerful (militarily) that state may be. 
This is because the Boko Haram 
imbroglio has not only been 
internationalized; it has become 
fundamentally a regional conflict, 
requiring the concerted action of all the 
states in the region and indeed in Black 
Africa. The ongoing collaboration 
between contiguous states to battle 
Boko Haram in the region is quite good, 
and must be carried on to its logical 
conclusion. 
It is also important to stress the fact that 
evidence all over the world have shown 
that terrorism cannot be resolved at the 
negotiation table. This has never yet 
been accomplished anywhere on earth. 
It would therefore seem futile and naïve 
to think of negotiating with terrorists, 
and especially fundamentalism-driven 
terrorism. Therefore, the defeat of Boko 
Haram must and can only be achieved in 
the short run through military operation 
in the battlefield. In the long run 
however, a total and sustainable victory 
over terror would only be achieved if 
and when the ecological circumstances 
that breed terrorism in the North East 
are removed and perhaps almost 
completely resolved through long-term 
policy options. The source of local 
personnel in the form of the readily 
available army of unemployed youths 
and almejiris must be permanently 
removed, not only within Nigeria, but 
throughout the entire sub-region 
 
Secondly, the high level of illiteracy in 
the Northern Nigeria must be 
sustainably dealt with through formal 
education and a programme of human 
capital development in the region. In 
fact, the sustainable development 
indices must be pursued with extreme 
vigour and determination by successive 
governments in Nigeria. National 
integration through a politics devoid of 
hate and bitterness must be employed to 
evolve a new political socialization and 
mobilization process to reduce 
primordial loyalties and develop a truly 
Nigerian political culture and 
orientation. 
 
The new thrust worldwide of aggressive 
pursuit of SDGs must be internalized by 
the political elites, and pursued with 
vigour. But all of this can only be 
attained if the anti-corruption war now 
beginning in Nigeria is upheld and 
sustained. Thirdly, Nigeria must follow 
up very quickly on the resolutions 
agreed upon at the Paris Summit by 
constructive diplomatic engagements 
with her neighbours to begin the 
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implementation of the synergistic 
security agreements aimed at 
checkmating the insurgency.  
 
Fourthly, it is extremely important that 
the Nigerian state aggressively equips 
its army, the security establishments and 
the immigration service with modern 
surveillance and patrol gadgets for 
effective monitoring of her borders. And 
since it was recently reported that 
Nigeria has developed the technology 
for the production of drones, it is 
recommended that drones be acquired or 
be produced and deployed for effective 
monitoring of all the country‟s land 
borders. 
 
Finally, the urgent necessity for 
diversification of the Nigerian economy, 
the encouragement of Agriculture and 
Food Production, as well as raw 
materials for an effective programme of 
industrialization must be pursued 
vigorously to reduce unemployment 
among youths, and thus also reduce 
poverty in the land. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria 
should be seen as an eye opener in 
regard to the past calls for the 
development of a strong, virile, well 
equipped modern and mobile military 
that is second to none in Africa. And 
which should at least compare with a 
middle-level European power like 
France. This call which was made long 
ago by Professor Akinwande Bolaji 
Akinyemi and known as the Strategic 
Doctrine needs to be revisited and taken 
seriously.  
 
Finally, Nigeria is constitutionally a 
secular state, and must not only remain 
such, but also seen to be so. The State‟s 
sponsorship of religious pilgrimages and 
affiliation with international religious 
groupings must be discouraged. 
Nigerian children and youths should be 
properly socialized to imbibe secular 
values of loyalty and patriotism through 
the right kind of education to inculcate 
national, instead of religious and 
sectional values. Religion itself should 
be left in the private and personal realm 
which in other climes has brought 
immense benefit to state and citizens. 
One of the most invidious blights that 
has plagued the Nigerian nation for 
many years now, and which has taken 
new and very frightful dimensions in 
recent years is the problem of 
corruption. The current administration 
of President Muhammadu Buhari has 
committed itself to a war against this 
malaise. This battle must be won, for 
Nigeria to emerge from the doldrums of 
economic, depression, social 
Darwinism, and political regression 
towards the status of a failed state. 
These are the ingredients for preparation 
of an ideal soil for international 
terrorism. To conclusively defeat 
international terrorism, Nigeria must 
defeat this malaise, and reduce 
corruption to the barest minimum. 
 
Finally, the Country must invest more 
vigorously in youth education, to reduce 
illiteracy and the phenomenon of youth 
unemployability, and thus reduce the 
number of young people from among 
which terrorists and their sponsors can 
recruit their foot soldiers. The 
phenomenon of almejiris tends to 
produce a ready-made pool of 
indoctrinated youths who can easily be 
instigated and incited to violence. Youth 
unemployment and poverty reduction 
should be made a national pet project, 
and above all, accountability and good 
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